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The Transition Is Already Happening (And It’s
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Even if Trump were resolved to thwart a smooth transition, much of
the process lies entirely outside his control.
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Sometime in early to mid-November, if October polling holds and the
infrastructure of our democracy basically functions, Joe Biden is likely
to be declared the winner of the 2020 presidential election. At that
point, he will have just more than two months to prepare to take over
the leadership of a country still in the grips of a once-in-a-century
pandemic, with more than 12 million Americans unemployed, tens of
millions of children out of school, and COVID-19 deaths barreling
toward 300,000.
Transitions can be challenging even under the best circumstances.
And President Donald Trump, to say the least, may not be

psychologically or temperamentally predisposed to a thoughtful, wellplanned transition. Even back when he was the incoming president,
his on-ramp to the presidency was extraordinarily haphazard,
disorganized, and incomplete. Add in his petulance and expected fury
at the outcome, and there is surely reason to fear the havoc the
president and his team could wreak on their way to the exits.
How worried should Americans be that the outgoing administration
might attempt to disrupt or cripple its successor by sabotaging the
transition? Well, somewhat, undeniably. There is certainly no reason to
expect President Trump to approach a President-elect Biden in
anything like the spirit of cooperation and goodwill that has generally
characterized presidential departures in the modern era. (Consider the
letter that outgoing President George H. W. Bush left in the Oval Office
for incoming President Bill Clinton, who had just defeated him at the
ballot box: “I’m not a very good one to give advice; but just don’t let
the critics discourage you or push you off course. You will be our
President when you read this note. I wish you well. I wish your family
well. Your success now is our country’s success. I am rooting hard for
you.”) Nor should anyone expect Trump to adhere to the bipartisan
conventions of presidential stewardship of modern transitions.
Further, by litigating the election outcome and delaying his
concession, the president might postpone the point at which Biden is
acknowledged the victor, thus delaying funding and many transitionrelated activities, as happened in 2000.
But there’s reason to have faith, too. When it comes to the transition

itself—not the niceties that surround it—a little-known body of law and
practice places important limitations on the amount of damage even
a determined outgoing president can do. The law vests significant
authority for managing transitions in career officials—that is, officials
whose employment does not turn on or change with the occupant of
the White House—who owe higher duties to the transition or incoming
administration than they do to the outgoing administration. This
means that however resolved Trump might be to thwart a smooth
transition—or, short of that, however lackadaisical he might be in
managing one—much of the process lies entirely outside his control.

For much of American history, presidential transitions were casual
affairs, typified by a long post-campaign vacation for the winning
candidate and little organized communication or cooperation
between incoming and outgoing administrations. That shifted during
the first half of the 20th century, but no law of presidential transitions
existed until 1964. That year, Congress passed the Presidential
Transition Act (PTA), which is central to how modern transitions are
run. This law—and its many amendments, the most recent of which
was enacted just this year—provides millions of dollars in funding for
transition operations and requires the government to support
potential incoming administrations with information, expertise, and
direct assistance.
Strikingly, Congress placed almost all the responsibility for managing
the transition in the hands of career employees. This means that
when it comes to matters of transition, the president and those
immediately surrounding him are less important than they seem: The
real action lies with career staff in the agencies.
It’s worth examining a few specifics, both to understand the basic
infrastructure of transition and to learn what we should be looking for
as warning signs that things are about to go off the rails.
The Act requires that four entities or positions be in place six months
before the election. As described in a set of legally required reports
from the General Services Administration to Congress, all are indeed
up and running:
A federal transition coordinator. Notably, the FTC is selected not by
the president but by the head of the GSA and must be a “senior
career appointee” at GSA.
A White House Transition Coordinating Council. In 2010, Congress
amended the PTA to provide that the incumbent “may” set up a
White House Transition Coordinating Council, something Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush had each done in their final (though
not their fourth) year in office. In 2012, President Barack Obama,
running for reelection, did not do so, and in 2016, Congress
changed the “may” to a “shall.” The Council is emphatically not an

entity of career officials. Generally chaired by the White House
chief of staff (as the current council is) or a deputy chief of staff
and packed with White House officials, it also includes the FTC and
representatives of both campaigns.
An Agency Transition Directors Council. The Council, also required
by the 2016 amendments, is to consist of “a senior representative”
from each Cabinet department, the Office of Personnel
Management, the Office of Government Ethics, the National
Archives and Records Administration, and “any other agency
determined by the Co-Chairpersons to be an agency that has
significant responsibilities relating to the transition process,” along
with the major candidates’ representatives. It was widely
understood that that “senior representative,” who also heads
transition activities within her agency, would be a career official,
and the Obama executive order creating the 2016 council specified
the same. Just this year, Congress codified that understanding; by
law, agency transition directors cannot be political appointees; they
must be senior career staff. With the exception of the Office of
Management and Budget co-chair, the current council consists
entirely of career officials.
Transition directors in individual agencies. The PTA requires “every
agency”—not just those with a representative on the Agency
Transition Directors Council—to assign an employee to oversee
transition activities. Once again, this employee must, as a matter of
law, be a “senior career employee.” Back in May, the OMB
instructed more than 100 agencies to identify a point of contact for
communications regarding transition activities.
All of this is in place. In addition, the GSA has provided office space in
Washington for the Biden team and negotiated, as the PTA requires, a
memorandum of understanding with the Biden team that will be
signed if and when it is apparent that Biden has won the election.
Thus, all the early tests have been met. To be sure, the early tests are
easy, as they involve flat legal requirements. So one cannot be too
reassured. But compliance is not nothing.

The next crucial date will be November 1. That is the date by which—
again, according to statute—each agency is to have completed a set
of briefing materials for the incoming administration. Those materials
seem likely to indeed be produced. If they are not, then it is time to
worry. But the real concern is whether the materials are complete,
frank, and accurate. From the outside, one can tell that a task has
been completed, but not how well.
A second potential indicator of whether those currently in office are
providing meaningful assistance to their successors concerns the
assignment of agency staff directly to the transition. This requires an
explanation.
Under the PTA, transition staffers are not considered federal
employees, even though the United States covers their salary (up to
the limits of approved funding). But there is an exception. Transition
staff can include people who work in an agency or for Congress: “Any
employee of any agency of any branch of the Government … may be
detailed to [the transition-office staff] on a reimbursable basis with
the consent of the head of the agency.” The position is an odd one to
be in: still an agency employee, but working for the transition.
Although that dual status may pose a conceptual challenge, one thing
is clear, namely who the boss is: “While so detailed such employee
shall be responsible only to the President-elect or Vice-President-elect
for the performance of his duties.”
This arrangement is important for two reasons. First, it emphasizes
our main point, that the structure of transitions minimizes the chance
of mischief. As a practical matter, any detailed employee will be a
career official and, in practice and as a matter of law, such an
employee will be working for the president-elect, not for the president.
Second, how much and how easily this occurs will be revealing.
Formally, the president-elect’s transition team notifies the agency,
sending a copy of its request to the federal transition coordinator, that
it would like a particular employee detailed to the transition. The
arrangement proceeds only if the agency head approves. So if the
transition team requests that multiple employees be detailed to it and

the relevant agency heads approve, that is a sign of cooperation; if no
requests are forthcoming, that is worrisome; if requests are denied,
that is a very bad sign.
In sum, the very presence of career officials in government during the
transition period, and their obligations to and involvement with
incoming administrations, serve as a bulwark against the possibility
that an outgoing administration might successfully work to thwart or
undermine a smooth transition.
One last consideration counsels calm. More than one past transition
has gotten in trouble because it was staffed entirely by people with
little Washington experience. Those are the people most in need of
assistance from the outgoing administration and career staff; they are
most vulnerable to a lack of cooperation. No such concerns apply to
the Biden-Harris transition team, which is at the opposite pole. The
former vice president is getting the band back together; his transition
team is peppered with former Obama-administration officials, and at
its helm are Jeffrey Zients, who ran the OMB during the Obama
administration, and the long-time Biden aide Ted Kaufman, who
during his time in the Senate co-sponsored one of the recent rounds
of amendments to the PTA. That approach has pros and cons, but it
does mean that the transition team needs less help and will be hard
to mislead or strand.
We do not mean to be Pollyannaish. It would be better—much better—
if the outgoing administration showed the cooperation, neutrality, and
graciousness that George W. Bush and Barack Obama both displayed.
And whatever the timeline, questions of national intelligence and
security prompt particular worry, because the director of national
intelligence—who at present is not a career official and in fact is
widely seen as having politicized intelligence—arranges and oversees
the relevant transition briefings. Biden supporters should not feel they
are out of the woods if he wins the election. Plenty of things could still
go wrong before noon on January 20.
But overall, the transition is a setting in which the independence of the
incoming administration and the participation of career officials will

limit the damage the outgoing president can cause. A defeated and
vindictive Trump could well find many ways to make the time between
the election’s resolution and the inauguration a national nightmare.
But the real threats will be out in the open—attacks on the legitimacy
of the election, unhinged policy initiatives, foreign misadventures,
encouragement of private violence, more aggressive judicial
appointments, or investigations or even indictments of political rivals
—not a subtle undermining of the transition.
Finally, there is a larger lesson here about the “deep state.” President
Trump has engaged in attacks on career officials throughout his
administration, including an executive order issued just last week that
would remove important civil-service protections from a newly
created and defined class of federal workers. The Trumpian
bogeyman version of the deep state is a caricature that takes modest
and episodic tendencies and exaggerates them beyond all
recognition. But the existence of a knowledgeable and permanent
staff that participates in, helps shape, and is necessary to implement
the goals and objectives of elected officials can serve a moderating
function. The function is something like the metaphor generally
credited to George Washington that the Senate serves to “cool” House
legislation just as a saucer is used to cool hot tea. The civil service—
technocratic, objective, neutral, and around for the long haul—is an
insurance policy in many ways, of which its central role in the
transition is just one.

